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1 
 
Bletchley Park and the Development of the Rockex Cipher Systems: 
Building a Technocratic Culture, 1941–1945 
 
 
The Government Code and Cypher School (GC&CS), housed at Bletchley Park during the Second 
World War, has widely been acknowledged to have been a major hub of wartime technological 
research. Despite its reputation for technocracy, until relatively late in the war the design and 
construction of technology by the agency was conducted in an ad hoc and piecemeal fashion to 
address specific problems. More generally, the agency's initial approach to its mandate (the reading 
of communications traffic of foreign powers and the security of Britain own traffic) was notable for 
its collegiate amateurism. Yet, in 1943, it undertook a machine development project which was very 
different from the technology projects which had preceded it because it was characterised by 
professionalism and long-term planning. That project was the Rockex cipher system, and it marked 
the culmination of a wider cultural transformation in the wartime agency as it moved towards 
professionalism. That Bletchley Park underwent transformation has been well established and some 
of the important social and bureaucratic aspects of these changes have been considered in detail.1 
However, the actual processes of cultural change within the agency, resulting in professionalisation 
and mechanisation, still remain poorly understood. This article, utilising the Rockex project as a 
case study will outline those processes, moreover it will demonstrate that the project itself played a 
hitherto unrecognised key role as a catalyst in that process. 
 
At the beginning of the Second World War, GC&CS was woefully unprepared for the contest that 
would come over following six years. The agency had been crippled by retrenchment following the 
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First World War, and had only gradually rebuilt its resources over the interwar period.2 In 1939 it 
had only around 200 staff members, and had little in the way of (or regard for) cutting edge 
technology.3 It was largely staffed by a contingent of Oxbridge graduates educated in the Arts and 
Classics, and a modest clerical and administrative team.4 Yet, by the end of the war it employed 
over 10,000 staff members, was a world leader in technology, and had expanded its ranks to 
incorporate increasing numbers of mathematicians, scientists, engineers, and professionals from the 
business world. As Jon Agar notes, by 1944 it had transformed from a collegiate organisation 
modelled on the university common-room into a highly sophisticated information processing 
factory, and that mechanisation was key to that evolutionary process.5 The challenges of the Second 
World War had forced the agency constantly to adapt to changing circumstances to stay ahead of its 
rivals in the information war. Gradual professionalisation and mechanisation were the products of 
that process. The organization theorist Christopher Grey has outlined how the agency was able to 
introduced mechanised factory-like, sections while also retain considerable elements of its pre-war 
character. At least some of the collegiate quality of several core sections of the agency remained 
intact, and both types of section were utilised in conjunction over the course of the war. The result 
was that the culture of the agency was a composite or, as Grey describes it, a 'matrix', that brought 
together numerous different groups determined by differing social classes, backgrounds, educations, 
ages, and professions.6 Meanwhile, for Agar, Bletchley Park serves as an example of wider 
transformation across government as a whole, a result of the growth of an increasingly powerful 
scientific specialist middle rank of the civil service, with a technocratic ideology, who were able to 
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mechanise processes of the state.7  
 
 
Profound though the introduction of machines to the agency was, it is necessary to recognise that 
these devices were only tenuous solutions to the problems the agency faced; minor alterations in the 
cryptographic techniques of the Axis powers would render the agency's machines obsolete. The 
result was that, in spite of their successes with machines, by 1943 important technocratically-
minded individuals within the agency's management, such as the mathematician Gordon Welchman, 
viewed the agency's history of building and incorporating machines with growing dissatisfaction. 
The technocrats within the agency represented a new breed of cryptanalyst and manager. Where the 
agency's traditional hunting grounds for recruits had been the humanities departments of Britain's 
ancient universities, in wartime the agency instead increasingly turned to mathematicians. The 
result was that some of these individuals had technical and mechanical skills that led to the agency's 
early mechanisation programme. The process of mechanisation they initiated was transformative 
but gradual, and by the end of the war the agency was instead characterised by professionalism, and 
by its strong emphasis on planning and mechanised industrialism. So considerable was this 
transformation that Britain was to emerge in 1945 as a world leader in communications security and 
cryptanalysis, complete with cutting edge technologies.8  The project to build Rockex family of 
cipher machines marked a hitherto unrecognised turning point that process of transformation. When 
the agency adopted the project in 1943, the cultural changes that had been underway since 1939 
were catalysed, and the project was identified by men like Welchman as a new beginning for the 
agency.  
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On a technical level, the Rockex project itself marked the next step in the evolution of machine 
cryptography.9 Where the previous generation of cipher machines typically utilised rotors as the 
primary means to scramble messages, Rockex utilised teleprinter technology to jumble two streams 
of data together. Significantly, the project also marked the next step in how the agency went about 
designing and introducing new machines. The project incorporated the lessons of machine design 
and implementation learned earlier in the war, but more importantly was seen as an opportunity to 
serve as a test case for future projects. Moreover, unlike previous wartime machine development 
projects, the Rockex was designed with long-term objectives in mind; the security of British 
communications well into the post-war period.  
 
By 1943 GC&CS was in a position to approach the process of mechanisation in the manner 
suggested by its technocrats; with a clear emphasis on planning and testing. Its successes had won 
the agency the respect of Whitehall and the armed services, but more importantly the gradual 
cultural transformation towards professionalisation had progressed sufficiently to allow the Rockex 
project to serve as a trial for extending that professionalism to the key area of mechanisation, and 
the project itself served to further catalyse that process. Machine research and development had at 
last taken centre stage in the agency's vision for its long-term future.  
 
Mechanising the Government Code and Cypher School  
 
GC&CS had come a long way by 1943. The agency, born in 1919, was an amalgamation of the 
Admiralty's First World War cryptanalytic bureau, Room 40, and its War Office counterpart, 
Military Intelligence 1B. The two bureaus had been relatively modest institutions during the First 
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World War; Room 40, for example, had some 100 staff members on its books at its height.10 
However, the newly formed GC&CS suffered under post-war retrenchment and began life with just 
56 staff members.11 Over the twenty years from its inception to the outbreak of the Second World 
War, the agency had profited only little from Britain's rearmament policy, and, as noted above, 
when GC&CS relocated to Bletchley Park in 1939 it still employed only 200 staff.12 Moreover, 
most of these were relatively new to the agency, having been recruited in the late 1930s as the 
international situation became increasingly tense.13 The result was that GC&CS was unprepared for 
the challenges posed by a new global conflict. A significant problem was that over the course of the 
inter-war period communications security had undergone a major transformation. During the First 
World War ciphers had been non-mechanical, but during the inter-war period the Axis powers had 
introduced highly sophisticated mechanical cipher systems, the most famous of these being Enigma.  
 
 
Enigma posed an unprecedented problem for cryptanalysts. The system revolutionised cipher 
security by offering portability, relatively swift operation, and an extremely high degree of security. 
Indeed, the system was so secure that British cryptanalysts swiftly arrived at the conclusion that it 
unbreakable and invested their energies in other less secure communications networks, in particular 
Soviet traffic.14 In the late 1930s, the only potential means that the agency could see to make major 
headway with Enigma was to place faith in technology: the problem posed by a mechanical cipher 
machine required a mechanical solution.15 However, at that time, GC&CS had no such technology, 
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and neither did it have the technically proficient staff to design one, nor the inclination let alone 
resources to put any such design into production. The looming hostilities in the final months of the 
inter-war period demanded a reconsideration of this position.16  
 
 
A shift towards mechanising cryptanalysis was generate shortly before the German invasion of 
Poland, when a conference between British, Polish and French cryptanalysts was organised. 
Unbeknownst to GC&CS, Polish cryptanalysts, of course worried by a resurgent and increasingly 
militaristic and expansionist Germany, had been investigating Enigma to.17 Unlike the British, 
however, the Poles had heavily invested in the problem and applied their most proficient young 
cryptanalysts to addressing it. Like their British counterparts in GC&CS, the Poles concluded that 
the development of new mechanical cryptanalytic technology was essential not merely to break the 
variants of Enigma being used at that time by the German military services, but to break it regularly 
and in a sufficiently timely fashion to allow the Polish intelligence service to make use of the 
information gained. However, unlike the British, the Polish cryptanalysts had set about designing 
and developing just such a machine, namely the Bomba.18  
 
 
The fact that the Poles had designed, built and begun successfully to utilise a custom-made 
cryptanalytic machine to address the new problems posed by mechanised ciphers, while GC&CS 
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had identified the same problem and solution but had progressed no further, reflected the difference 
in the respective nations' intelligence cultures. After the First World War, the newly-formed GC&CS 
had modelled itself on its predecessor organisations, primarily Room 40, and retained the same 
modes and methods of recruitment. Emphasis was placed on the recruitment of like-minded 
individuals to those already in post: primarily linguists and classicists from Britain's ancient 
universities.19 The problem of mechanical cipher systems was to change this policy. In the late 
1930s it became increasingly obvious that a new breed of cryptanalyst, individuals with 
mathematical expertise, were required. While some mathematicians had been recruited to work as 
cryptanalysts since the late 1920s, in the run up to the Second World War the agency's recruiters 
increasingly turned to the mathematics departments of Britain's universities.20 The Poles, on the 
other hand, placed a primacy on the recruitment of mathematicians from the moment that their 
serious investment in cryptanalysis began. The recruitment of highly accomplished mathematicians 
brought to the Polish camp a range of skills and approaches to the Enigma problem that Britain's 
cryptanalysts, even with their experience from the First World War, could not bring to bear. In 
particular, the Polish mathematicians possessed a technical understanding of mechanics and 
engineering which would allow the development of cryptanalytic technology like the Bomba.   
 
 
The revelation that cryptanalytic machinery could be developed, and the influx of scientists and 
mathematicians into the agency in the late 1930s, chief among them the young Cambridge 
University mathematicians Alan Turing and Gordon Welchman, provided GC&CS the opportunity 
to emulate the Polish example.21 Nevertheless, despite the clear necessity of developing machine 
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technology to counter the Enigma problem, there remained little enthusiasm to break with tradition 
and develop a British machine to attack Enigma. It was only the perseverance of Turing, Welchman, 
and a very few members of GC&CS's 'Old Guard' who saw the potential in mechanised solutions to 
the Enigma problem, that led the development of the British Bombe (named in honour of the Polish 
Bomba, its spiritual, though not technical, predecessor).22  
 
The genesis of the Bombe machine, designed by Turing and further upgraded by Welchman, proved 
a major technical breakthrough for GC&CS and transformed its ability to rapidly break and read 
Enigma traffic. However, before mass production of the machine could be undertaken, three major 
structural changes to the agency were necessary. First, the agency had to forge important links with 
external institutions capable of turning the ideas behind the machine into a mechanical reality. The 
agency had neither the engineering expertise nor the factory facilities to build Bombe machines, 
still less to produce them in substantial numbers on a regular basis. To facilitate a building 
programme, the agency turned to the British Tabulating Machine Company and its workshops 
housed in Letchworth.23 Second, the agency also required a substantial staff contingent to operate 
the machines. This was absolutely imperative: for each machine that arrived from BTM's 
production line, at least ten staff were required to operate it on a 24-hour basis.24 Furthermore, once 
the Bombe machines began rapidly to accelerate the rate at which GC&CS could produce viable 
intelligence, greater bureaucratisation of the agency was necessary. Further staff were required to 
perform the substantial additional administrative and clerical work arising, and to establish a major 
communications machine section to distribute a large amount of information to Whitehall and 
commands in the field. Fortunately, GC&CS was able to draw upon the sizable pools of labour at 
the disposal of its client ministries. In the case of Bombe operation, the agency requested that the 
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Admiralty to provide operators in the form of young women from the Women's Royal Naval 
Service, while communications staff and clerical workers were drawn from the Women's Auxiliary 
Air Force and Foreign Office respectively.25 Third, the amount of Axis traffic intercepted by the 
British increased rapidly, and beyond the capacity of the new Bombe machines to easily process.  In 
turn, this required the creation of a bureaucratic process to allocate machine time, which would 
distribute Bombe usage so to prevent GC&CS's machine resources being monopolised by just one 
of the agency's actual or potential client ministries.26 Ultimately, GC&CS, in order to successfully 
utilise its new technology, was slowly to develop an information production line operated on 
professional factory principles.  
 
 
This process of professionalisation was, however, by no means smooth. As in the case of 
developing the Bombe machine, in the first instance there was both resistance and lethargy within 
the agency when it came to the creation of a bureaucratic body to allocate Bombe time. Indeed, 
despite the first Bombe machine being delivered to Bletchley Park in 1940, it was not until 1942 
that a committee to oversee the allocation of Bombe time was introduced.27 Also problematically, 
the machines developed by GC&CS, though ultimately successful, were only barely sufficient to 
address the volume of traffic that arrived at Bletchley's gates and the complexity of the ciphers 
which protected that traffic.28 Minor alterations to Axis cipher procedure, or to technical 
specifications of the cipher machines, could swiftly render the Bombe machines, and those designed 
to tackle other cipher systems, ineffective. Moreover, the actual building of machines and 
development of improvements were processes fraught with difficulty. First, the agency suffered 
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production and supply problems, and machines arrived from Letchworth in only limited numbers 
until 1943. 29  Though this was not the fault of GC&CS, the lethargy in the implementation of a 
system to allocate Bombe time served only to aggravate the problem. Second, the agency arranged 
for two different teams of contractors to work on the development of upgrades for the system and 
the competition between the rival groups, as well as their champions within the agency, resulted in 
months of bitter acrimony and delay.30  
 
 
There was also a failure to adequately address the personnel problems derived from mechanisation. 
First, GC&CS did not receive enough operators, an issue which came to a head in October 1941 
when four of the agency's most senior cryptanalysts wrote directly to the Prime Minister, going over 
the heads of the agency's commanding officer, Alistair Denniston, as well as its Director and head 
of the Secret Intelligence Service, Sir Stewart Menzies, to request more personnel and resources.31 
However, with increasing personnel came other problems, not least accommodating and feeding 
workers. In these arenas GC&CS lurched from one administrative crisis to the next as the number 
of employees increased beyond the capacity of the existing facilities to cope. In each instance, the 
agency was forced repeatedly and rapidly to develop new solutions to both accommodation and 
catering as the existing services were pushed to breaking point.32  
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The perennial problem GC&CS faced in the opening years of the war was that its primary mandate, 
the rapid breaking and subsequent reading of Axis traffic, and required increasingly vast resources 
and bureaucratic structures. The retrenchment of the inter-war period, and the institutional culture of 
that period, had left the agency unprepared for the challenges posed by the Second World War. The 
introduction of mechanised cryptanalytic processes required an exponential increase in both staffing 
and materiel which agency officials had no experience in either managing or developing. 
Importantly, the escalation of the war, and with it the rapid increase in the amount of traffic the 
agency was required to read, meant that systematic envisioning of future requirements was all but 
impossible, and therefore planning was hindered. The agency was forced to develop ad hoc 
remedies to the problems it faced and the resulting solutions, bureaucratic and technological, were 
fragile and in need of constant adaptation.  
 
 
The result was that the agency of 1943 was remarkably different to the agency of 1939. First, it was 
substantially larger, having accumulated grown from around 200 in 1939 staff to 5,053 by June 
1943.33 Second, the once green lawns and gardens of the Bletchley Park estate had been 
transformed into a hive of prefabricated huts and concrete blocks. Third, the personnel inhabiting 
the estate’s buildings, once dominated by staff drawn from the universities, primarily comprised 
young women performing any one of a number of essential low grade functions, from machine 
operation to administration  of the agency's sprawling bureaucracy.34 Further up the agency's food-
chain, the ranks of the cryptanalysts, once dominated by classicists and arts graduates, were now 
increasingly populated by mathematicians and other scientists. In short, the agency had, in a manner 
that was almost entirely unplanned, evolved into a vast and unique bureaucracy, centred on effective 
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utilisation of technology. With the lessons of the recent past in mind, the agency would approach the 
Rockex project with a hitherto unprecedented degree of technocracy and professionalism. 
 
 
The Rockex System 
 
The Rockex was a machine which utilised teleprinter technology to produce ciphers capable of 
concealing the content of messages transmitted both by cable and wireless.35 While this machine 
still remains has failed to attract the public and scholarly interest of some of GC&CS's other 
machines, most notably the Bombe machine, it has been some historical study. For instance, the 
intelligence historian John Ferris, as well as the published internal history of the British Security 
Coordination, have already summarised the technical specifications and operation of the machine.36 
In addition, Ferris considered the influence of geopolitical and diplomatic environment on the 
development of Rockex. It is, therefore, beyond the provision of a brief, unnecessary to comment 
on the machine's technical specifications or origins here. However, missing from Ferris' account is a 
commentary on the internal cultural forces within the agency, which drove GC&CS towards 
professionalisation and mechanisation, and had a profound influence on the machine's development. 
Similarly, also missing is consideration of the role of the Rockex project itself in further catalysing 
change within the agency's internal culture. In particular, they include Gordon Welchman's 
dissatisfaction with the agency's previous wartime machine development programme and his efforts 
to professionalise technological development within the agency.   
 
Specifically, the significance of the Rockex project is that it demonstrates the increasing importance 
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of technology to the wartime agency, the role envisioned for technology in the agency's post-war 
future, and the machine's position as a major test case for future technological research and 
development. The system's development highlighted, the perceived problems with the past ad hoc 
approach, demonstrated a clear desire to cut a new path for the future, and showcased a profound 
shift in the development of the agency's own culture, with technology taking centre-stage. 
 
 
The Rockex system came into being at a fortuitous moment. By 1942, those branches of the British 
state with a direct vested interest in the security of British communications traffic – particularly the 
intelligence agencies, the Foreign Office, Cabinet Office, and Service Ministries – were becoming 
increasingly concerned about the potential weakness of existing cipher systems. Since the 1930s, 
the British state's high-grade material was enciphered by the machine cipher system Type-x. Type-x 
was modelled, albeit with significant security improvements, on the German Enigma system. While 
the system offered an extremely high degree of security, Britain's own successes against Enigma, 
which the Axis powers believed was unbreakable, highlighted the dangers of taking security for 
granted. Some worrying, though unconfirmed, signs were beginning to emerge that Type-x might be 
vulnerable. Meanwhile, some of Britain's traffic, enciphered using lower graded systems, had 
certainly been read.37 Of course, Britain did not need to worry only about enemy powers. There was 
always the threat that cryptanalysts in the employ of friendly powers might also attempt to read 
British traffic. Chiefly, despite being Britain's closest ally, of creasing concern was the United States 
of America.38 Though coming to the realm of signals intelligence somewhat late, by 1943 the US 
had developed significant cryptanalytic capabilities – and British security specialists had become 
                                                 
37
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convinced that if a US effort were made to read British traffic, it could very well succeed.39  
 
Clearly then, Britain needed a new system to alleviate the growing sense of unease. The system 
elected for development was Rockex. Rockex had its origins in an American commercial 
Teleprinter cipher system, developed by the Western Union Telegraph Company, called 
Telekrypton.  In the most simplistic of terms, Telekrypton enciphered teleprinter traffic. Teleprinters 
employed a reel of tape to encode a message into teleprinter code, which could then be transmitted 
by cable. Telekrypton added a second reel of tape, but rather than containing a message, this tape 
was composed of random data. Combining the data from the two tapes, the resulting information 
was seemingly meaningless. A receiving machine armed with a duplicate reel of the same random 
tape could subtract the random data, leaving behind only the original message. Without a 
Telekrypton machine primed with an identical reel of random data, nobody could conceivably read 
the message. However, Telekrypton had two major problems. First, the machine was technically 
overly complex and prone to mechanical failure. Second, the tape containing random data was fed 
into the machine in a loop. In order to maximise security, and in doing so generate a 'one-time pad' 
(so named because the cipher's key, generated at random, is used once and only once), the tape 
needed to be potentially infinite in length.40 
 
 
Despite Telekrypton's clear flaws (which had made it a commercial failure), Benjamin De Forest 
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'Pat' Bayly, a Canadian professor of Electrical Engineering, still saw some potential in the system. 
Bayly had been recruited in 1941 by British Security Coordination (BSC), the Secret Intelligence 
Service's (SIS) arm in the US, to run its communications network, transmitting messages between 
London and New York via Ottawa. The volume of this traffic, and bottle-necks in the existing 
network, were causing delays. Bayly determined that a new mechanical apparatus, which would 
increase the speed at which messages were enciphered and forwarded from Ottawa, was necessary. 
He concluded that, by remodelling Telekrypton, and eliminating its flaws, he could make the system 
serve as an elegant solution to his problem. Consequently, Bayly set about stripping the machine of 
unnecessary parts and redesigning it to operate as a one-time pad system. However, before the 
system could be effectively used to transmit transatlantic traffic, Bayly needed to devise a method 
of converting teleprinter data into a form of data capable of being transmitted via wireless and in the 
medium of Morse Code. Teleprinter code employed 32 characters, but Morse only 26, and the 
additional six characters would, if not removed, corrupt the transmitted text. Bayly was able to 
solve this problem, and in doing so he created a new cipher system which was relatively rapid and 
enjoyed the unrivalled security offered by a one-time pad system.41 The new system was code-
named Rockex, though still called Telekrypton in some quarters. Its potential to provide ‘complete 
security’ (including against American attack) was advertised across Whitehall.42 
 
 
In addition to his work for BSC, Bayly's expertise in communications technology had led him into 
contact, in a consultancy role, with GC&CS. Bayly regularly advised the agency on cryptanalytic 
machinery, and communications systems, and liaised on behalf of the agency with its US 
counterparts.43 Unsurprisingly given both GC&CS's own direct interest in the field of 
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communications security, GC&CS took a great deal of interest in Rockex. GC&CS would go on to 
play a major role in advocating further research and development in the system. The fruit of this 
additional research and development was Rockex II.44   
 
Building Rockex II  
Bayly's work on a new cipher system was welcomed by GC&CS from the start because the agency 
required a secure means of transmitting its own secret wares across the Atlantic. Ferris notes that 
Commander Edward Travis, Bletchley Park's commanding officer from 1942, visited BSC in New 
York in January 1943 and was treated to a viewing of Bayly's new machine at the Rockefeller 
Centre, and that the first prototype of Rockex was shipped to England in the same month.45 
However, some evidence suggests that work on the first prototype did not begin until January 1943 
and that it was not until April that a machine was ready for shipping.46 Regardless, it is clear that 
GC&CS, in its capacity as Britain's chief cryptographic bureau and (along with SIS) one of the first 
employers of the system, was involved in monitoring the development of Bayly's machine from the 
earliest stages of the project.  
 
 
Rockex allowed almost instantaneous transmission of messages on a one-to-one basis. This meant 
that important messages could be transmitted very quickly and securely and GC&CS recognised the 
significance of Bayly's system from the first. Nevertheless, it was clear that the system would 
require further improvement if it were to take on a greater role in the British communications 
network. 47 Following Travis's initial viewing of the machine, Bayly set about producing further 
                                                                                                                                                                  
16 October 1943; TNA, HW 62/6, DD(S) [Edward Travis] to DNI [Director of Naval Intelligence], 11 January 1944. 
44
 TNA, HW 62/6, CSC, 'Rockex-II', 11 May 1944. 
45
 Ferris, Intelligence and Strategy, p. 172. 
46
 TNA, HW 62/5, Appendix: History, present position and future development, 7 December 1943. 
47
 Ferris, Intelligence and Strategy, p. 173. 
17 
 
prototype machines. Soon after the production of the first prototype, a second was constructed and 
transatlantic tests began. By May 1943 Rockex began carrying SIS and Ultra messages across the 
Atlantic.48  
 
 
Of course, because the original Rockex system was designed in order to secure the passage of 
potentially highly sensitive transatlantic traffic, GC&CS and SIS were not alone in having a vested 
interest in the utility of Bayly's work. The Cabinet Office, the Admiralty and the Foreign Office in 
particular also wished to make use of any new system and, like GC&CS, and closely followed the 
project's progress. The Cabinet Office and the Admiralty both had Rockex machines installed in 
September 1943.49 This was not, however, an inevitability. From the perspective of the Cabinet 
Office, the adoption of the Rockex system was a difficult decision. Other systems emerging in the 
same period, particularly the American voice-scrambling system 'X-Ray', provided stiff competition 
to Rockex. Rockex and X-Ray each had their own distinct advantages. X-Ray, on first examination, 
like Rockex was deemed to provide excellent security. Importantly, it offered the further advantage 
of allowing officials and ministers to correspond by voice. However, further investigation into X-
Ray revealed a number of potential problems from both technical and security perspectives. From 
the technical point of view, X-Ray muffled voices, creating the potential for a loss of clarity. 
Meanwhile, from a security perspective, because the system was of American origin, there was the 
potential that American cryptanalysts might prove able to eavesdrop on the conversations of British 
officials.50 The latter proved to be an intolerable risk, and Bayly's system gained the upper hand 
because it offered security from those who might intercept British traffic  ̶  be they enemies or 
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allies.51 Clearly, the existence of major rival systems highlighted the importance of both planning 
and experimentation. 
 
 
Despite the existence of a potential competitor system, Rockex continued to generate significant 
interest from across Whitehall. As early as August 1943, Edward Travis, then commanding officer 
of GC&CS, was providing reports of the system's capability that intrigued Foreign Office officials. 
They were impressed by the claim that the machine's speed was only 'limited by that obtainable 
from a good touch-typist, say 50 words a minute.' They also saw considerable utility in the fact that 
Bayly's modifications to the system allowed it to be used not only to transmit messages directly by 
telegraph (a feature the Foreign Office had little use for) but also as a standard cipher machine 
producing a stream of cipher text which could be transmitted via wireless. Additionally, the promise 
of more improvements to come made Bayly's machine increasingly attractive. As a result of Travis' 
outline of the system's specifications, the Foreign Office suggested that the system undergo 
immediate and thorough testing to ensure that it could indeed perform as described.52 The Foreign 
Office's request for swift action was the product of two issues. First, the system's promised 
specifications suggested a very formidable machine. Second, it was projected that the establishment 
of missions in re-occupied countries would place a great strain on the Ministry's communications 
infrastructure and staff that could create the 'danger of complete breakdown of cypher 
communications.'53   
 
 
Bayly's earlier work as a consultant for GC&CS resulted in a growing personal and professional 
                                                 
51
 TNA, CAB 122/561, Joint Staff Mission to War Cabinet Offices, 17 September 1943. 
52
 TNA, FO 850/47b, Minutes, Y5031, 31 August 1943. 
53
 TNA, FO 850/47b, W.M. Cadrington to 'C' [Sir Stewart Menzies, Director of SIS], 6 September 1943. 
19 
 
friendship between himself and Gordon Welchman, the technocratic, managerially-minded and 
senior ranking cryptanalyst.54 In addition to considering mechanical cryptographic problems, one of 
the key discussions between Welchman and Bayly was on the future of machine cryptography. 
During a visit by Bayly to GC&CS, he and Welchman forged ahead with the problems inherent in 
turning Rockex into a viable machine for widespread use by GC&CS and other branches of the 
British state. The key problem remained the issue of converting Rockex into a system that could 
produce a cipher transmittable by wireless without corruptions. In a report to Commander Travis, 
Welchman warned that considerable theoretical work followed by a significant period of testing and 
experimentation were required before any viable system could be introduced.55 
 
 
When Bayly returned to his post in Canada, he and Welchman kept in touch, and Welchman 
remained intrigued by the Rockex system and how it could be improved.56 Work on producing a 
more robust system of greater flexibility soon developed into the Rockex II project. Bayly 
continued to liaise with GC&CS, including discussions with Alan Turing as well as Welchman 
during various trans-Atlantic visits.57 Work on Rockex II generated swift results, and in December 
1943 GC&CS reported on the progress of the project.  It commented that 'The fact that it has been 
possible to design and build machines so quickly and the small amount of trouble that has been 
encountered in preliminary tests are encouraging indications of the simplicity of probable reliability 
of the apparatus.' However, this optimistic appraisal of the situation was qualified with the caveat 
that nevertheless 'there is no doubt that the development has been done in a hurry and that these first 
machines must be regarded as pre-prototypes, and more extensive trials are likely to suggest 
modification.' It was recommended that, prior to engaging in mass production of the machine, 
                                                 
54
 W. G. Welchman, The Hut Six Story: Breaking the Enigma Codes (New York, McGraw-Hill, 1982), p. 171. 
55
 TNA, HW 62/5, Gordon Welchman to DD(S) [Commander Edward Travis, director of GC&CS], 16 October 1943. 
56
 TNA, HW 62/5, Welchman to Bayly, 26 November 1943. 
57
 Ferris, Intelligence and Strategy, p. 172. 
20 
 
further prototype models be constructed and the experiences gained with these machines be utilised 
in plans for future Rockex production.58 Over the next few months of testing, GC&CS's machine 
development specialists continued to be impressed by the progress made on Rockex II.59 The initial 
prototype work on Rockex II continued to be conducted in New York. However, by the summer of 
1944 the work had progressed still further and the first prototype machine arrived in England for 
experimentation in June.60 The emphasis on experimentation stood in contrast to the earlier 
processes of technological development utilised by GC&CS.  For instance, following the 
development of the Bombe machine, while also subject to periods of testing and experimentation, 
early models went into service extremely rapidly with orders placed for more machines, and much 
of the necessary refining of the apparatus for future models was the result of trial and error on live 
machines.61 Rockex II, on the other hand, as shown above, was subjected to a far more rigorous 
process of refinement before mass-production was to be contemplated.  
 
 
Once production was underway the task of making one time tape was assigned to the War Office 
and monitored by GC&CS.  Meanwhile, the task of building Rockex-II units was handled by the 
Radio Security Service at Hanslope Park, under the direction of Brigadier Richard Gambier-Parry, 
and machines were built there until 31 December 1946.62 Such were the expectations of the 
machine that even before the parts for the first model of Rockex II had been assembled, orders for 
large numbers of machines began flooding in, most notably from the War Office and the Foreign 
Office.  This was likely to prove problematic because the supply of some of the system’s key 
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components was limited.63 Mass production of Rockex II was also projected to be an expensive 
undertaking. In June 1944, the Treasury, while amenable to arguments stressing the need for the 
development of secret machinery, foresaw problems with the substantial cost of building just 50 
'experimental' machines. That cost was estimated at £70,000, only £10,000 of which was non-
recurring. The Cabinet Secretary, Sir Edward Bridges, wrote that he had 'had an unofficial word on 
the subject with [Sir Herbert] Brittain of the Treasury, who looks after the non-audit vote, and 
although he was only too ready to help, it was clear he did not much relish the idea of this 
expenditure being tabulated under S.S. monies.' Bridges' solution was to suggest that, rather than 
the costs be charged to the books of the 'S.S.' (presumably the Security Service), they be 
individually charged to recipient departments and that they be described as 'experimental'. This, as 
Bridges pointed out, was, in fact slightly misleading. Prototype machines had already undergone 
significant development and testing.64  However, it was certainly the case that 50 was a 
comparatively low number of machines given the growing demand for them from Whitehall 
departments. 
 
 
 The ‘experimental’ system of financing the construction of machines continued until 1951, when 
the scale of expenses, approximately £1 million per annum without any formal auditing, made 
Gambier-Parry ‘uncomfortable’ and he turned to the Treasury for assistance. By 1949, Gambier-
Parry had acquired a factory at Borehamwood, Hertfordshire, and had created a highly unorthodox 
system for hiding the cost of this secret enterprise. By then, money was flowing in from four 
sources: SIS, the Ministry of Supply, the Diplomatic Wireless Service, and the Commonwealth 
Relations Office. Of the £1,000,000, £600,000 came from the latter two and went into public bank 
accounts while the monies from the former two, approximately £400,000, went into two private 
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accounts in Gambier-Parry’s own name. The purpose of this ‘auditor’s nightmare’, as a Treasury 
official described it, was to keep the factory secret. The Treasury’s solution was to create a single 
suspense account operated by the Foreign Office.65 Of course, during the war and before it began to 
mount again, this expenditure was (despite the Treasury’s initial concerns) comparatively modest, 
even in relation only to wider spending on cryptanalytic machinery – which Welchman estimated 
already to have reached £3 million by July 1944.66  
 
 
Of course, the auditing crisis lay in the future and was out of GC&CS’s hands; in 1944, the agency 
did, however, have concerns of its own. Well aware of the fragile nature of the structures the agency 
had developed, Welchman, by then an Assistant Director at GC&CS and charged with the agency's 
programme of mechanisation,67 was determined that the agency learn from the problems it had 
encountered. Specifically, Welchman wanted a transformation in how the agency went about the 
design, development and utilisation of new technology. In July 1944, he outlined his vision of 
GC&CS's future role in Britain's communications security. He acknowledged that the agency's 
cryptanalytic machinery had only barely been up to the tasks for which they had been designed, that 
the machine building process had been amateurish, and that the agency had failed to envision the 
production and logistical problems involved in mass-production of machine technology.68 His most 
discerning observation was that cryptanalysis and cryptography were 'far more deeply interrelated 
than is superficially obvious', and that all future endeavours in the field of cryptography must 
contain clear input by seasoned, professional cryptanalysts. His suggested remedy was that a small 
team of carefully chosen individuals, provided with advice from expert technicians, be tasked with 
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the planning of new cipher machines within the wider context of communications planning. His 
justification for this decision was: 
 
 partly because of the enormous growth of wireless  communications and partly 
because of the increasing part played by machinery. Cryptography must now merge into the 
wider problem of providing secure and efficient communications, which must involve 
coordination between the development of cipher apparatus and the development of 
communications both on the technical side and the organisational side. 
 
 
This hard earned awareness, that new technology could not simply be introduced and operate 
smoothly without sufficient logistical, administrative and bureaucratic systems in place to support 
its implementation, meant he was keen to ensure that the design, construction programme and 
utilisation of Rockex II would be a different story. Welchman recognised that the Rockex II, to 
ensure that Britain had a long-term and robust security system, needed to be the subject of 
considerable planning, meticulous design, and developed with suitable factory facilities capable of 
swift mass-production.69 Welchman clearly won success in his effort to turn the development of 
Rockex II into a watershed project, in which a new approach to machine research and development 
was to be undertaken. When he and Bayly sought to begin work on another new cipher machine, a 
portable field unit, called RM(26), the work was to be conducted along the same lines that 
Welchman had stipulated for Rockex II. A team of GC&CS’s best cryptographers were seconded for 
six months to work on the project and the aim was, as with Rockex II, to ‘embody all the lessons 
learned during this war’ and meet Britain’s ‘security requirements for many years to come.’70 
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RM(26), despite early promise, was eventually jettisoned before it left the prototype stage because it 
proved incompatible with US cipher systems.71 Nevertheless, the approach to work on the system 
demonstrates the significance of the agency’s new professionalised approach to the development of 
technology, which if well designed and implemented had the potential for years of service before 
obsolescence, which had been first adopted with the Rockex II project. 
 
 
It is clear that other senior officials, with a stake in secure communication, had also reached similar 
conclusions. Six months earlier, in response to successful Axis penetration of some of Britain’s less 
secure cipher systems, the Cypher Policy Board had been established to oversee research, design, 
production and implementation of communications security systems and protocols.72 In addition to 
Sir Stuart Menzies, the head of SIS who acted as chairman, the Board also included GC&CS’s 
director Edward Travis, and from 1945 Welchman was its chief technical adviser.73 By October 
1945, Welchman’s prescription, that a dedicated group should manage cipher machine development, 
was becoming still closer to a reality with the formation of the Cypher Machine Development 
Committee (CMDC). The CMDC was comprised of numerous senior officials, tasked with 
communications matters, from across the Service Ministries, the Cypher Policy Board and GC&CS 
– including Welchman.74     
 
 
As noted, security had become an increasingly important concern throughout the war. Looking back 
at the issue retrospectively in September 1945, Menzies, in his capacity as chair of the Cypher 
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Policy Board, reminded his colleagues of the difficulties Britain's security experts had endured until 
1944.  
  
 
 Members are well aware that we have only maintained the security of British 
 Communications throughout the war with considerable difficulty and that in certain fields, 
 our security has been nothing like as good as it should have been 
 
 Although a great deal has been done to improve the situation over the 18 months and the 
 existence of the Cypher Policy Board and its supporting organisation should ensure that 
 British Communications Security is given adequate consideration in future, the position 
 cannot yet be regarded as satisfactory. 
 
 
Menzies also complained that while GC&CS had considerable expertise in the field of 
cryptography, throughout the war there had been ‘no planned means’ to apply that expertise and 
experience to the ‘security of British communications as a whole’. This was a gap that required 
filling, so that GC&CS could not only provide advice to its client ministries but also to ensure that, 
in future, the agency’s store of knowledge and experience was available to ‘planners and operators 
of Britain’s Communications.’75  
 
Much like in the case of GC&CS, the wider difficulties faced by British wartime security officials 
resulted in the measures and organisational apparatus put into place to deal with communications 
security being less the product of directed guidance and more the product of circumstance. The 
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failure to establish a central committee, in the form of the Cypher Policy Board, to address the 
question of communications security, until the final months of the war, is indicative of the wider 
failure to appreciate the benefits of centralised professional communications security planning 
across Whitehall until remarkably late in the day.  
 
Conclusions  
The development of the Rockex system, and its much improved successor Rockex II, was a lengthy 
process that saw inter-Service and department cooperation to develop a complex and revolutionary 
cypher system. The design and manufacture of the machine saw an unprecedented planning process 
by GC&CS which used the development of the machine as an opportunity to create a benchmark for 
future machine research and development. Such was the success of these efforts that variants of the 
Rockex family were still being utilised in some British embassies until at least the 1970s.76 As 
Ferris notes, in developing and adopting the machine in the final stages of the Second World War, 
the British state placed Britain as a world leader in cipher security at the outset of the Cold War.77 
 
 
Prior to the development of Rockex, machine design and research had been a fraught process 
instigated as a last resort to resolve pressing problems instigated by mounting wartime pressures. 
Frank Birch, a senior figure within the agency and the author of its internal history written in the 
early 1950s, complained in that history that the agency’s general administration and organisation in 
1940 had been like ‘a rudderless vessel’. This, he explained, was because when faced with ‘a 
succession of emergencies, only hand-to-mouth empirical improvisations are possible.’78 This was 
also very much true of machine development. By 1944, the agency had come to realize and accept 
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that this relatively last-minute and ad hoc approach (though necessary at the time) to developing its 
machine sections, could not continue. The machines developed under this approach, while 
enormously successful, were fragile solutions that could be easily undone by minor alterations to 
Axis cipher security systems or protocols. The experience of machine development had shown that 
both cryptanalysis and cryptography had entered a new age, and that future success would be 
predicated not only on the labours of technical experts with bright ideas, but on long term planning, 
bureaucratic oversight, and the building of logistical structures.  
 
 
These were lessons that were learned through trial and error and under conditions of enormous 
pressure to generate results. But, by the final years of the war, the pressures on the agency had been 
eased by the arrival of American resources and expertise. Furthermore, GC&CS had evolved into a 
large, professional and mechanised bureau, complete with teams of expert machine designers and 
builders and contacts with experts in high-end technology industries. The British state as a whole 
had also radically realigned itself to deal with the problem of developing communications security, 
with the formation of inter-service and ministry committees dedicated to overseeing and directing 
the development of cipher security. Without this combined shift in alignment, across the services 
and the agency, it is impossible to see how a system such as Rockex II could have been developed 
in the manner that it was. It is clear that GC&CS had transformed from a collegiate agency that had 
rapidly, and sometimes unwillingly, adopted mechanised solutions to address machine generated 
problems into an agency which placed massive emphasis on technology complete with an ingrained 
technocratic culture. The development of the Rockex family of cipher system was the first major 
product of that transformation. 
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For the historian looking to understand how and why GC&CS transformed itself from an archaic 
and beleaguered organisation, into a highly successful, professional and technologically first-rate 
intelligence agency, the development of the Rockex family of cipher machines is highly revealing. 
First, by juxtaposing the project with earlier machine development initiatives, Rockex clearly 
demonstrates the point at which the agency ceased to invest in technology as a last resort to address 
what had, hitherto, been unassailable problems. Instead, the agency had begun to see its newly 
forged technological prowess as a fundamental strength, which required careful nurturing and full 
integration into the agency’s plans for the future. Second, the development of Rockex highlights the 
importance of the somewhat under-recognised connections made by the agency with bodies such as 
BSC. The agency’s ability to recognise invaluable expertise in other quarters, and to cultivate 
connections with key specialists, such as Bayly, was central to its success.79 Third, the development 
of the system show-cases what was, perhaps, the greatest asset the agency possessed: the capacity 
for honest introspection. Only by careful critical examination of the agency’s performance, could 
GC&CS’s senior figures identify key grounds for improvement. The Rockex project, and the 
emphasis on learning from both successes and failures of the agency’s war to that point, was 
symptomatic of wider professionalising cultural changes within GC&CS that historians are only 
beginning to unravel.    
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